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Chapter 7
Life Cycle Impacts of the Financial Crisis on
Optimal Consumption—Portfolio Choices
and Labor Supply
Jingjing Chai, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell,
and Ralph Rogalla
Workers are increasingly required to invest in investment-based defined
contribution (DC) accounts, and then during their golden years, draw
down their pension assets in an orderly fashion. Such accounts can help
augment and partially replace public pension benefits, as aging economies
move toward better-funded old-age systems. Yet the recent financial crisis
has raised fresh concerns regarding the extent to which workers are
exposed to capital market shocks in these pension systems: for instance,
in 2008, US private pension fund assets declined by one-quarter or about
US$ 2.7 trillion (OECD, 2009; Whitehouse, 2010). Moreover, the subse-
quent economic crisis generated rising unemployment and falling labor
earnings, with the unfortunate effect of reducing worker contributions to
both Social Security and many private pension schemes. Indeed, the US
unemployment rate of 10 percent in 2009 was double that in 2007, with
similar high jobless rates elsewhere. These combined capital and labor
market shocks have made it much more difficult for retirement systems
to deliver anticipated old-age benefits. This chapter examines how house-
holds may be affected by the dual financial and economic crisis such as the
one recently experienced.
In particular, we explore how people might react to these shocks, by
adjusting their consumption–saving patterns, investment–annuitization
paths, work hours, and retirement patterns. Because actual responses are
both short- and long-term in nature, some of these will not be observable
for several decades to come; furthermore, responses are likely to be het-
erogeneous. That is, some younger workers may not react much, since they
have several decades to adjust before they retire, whereas workers on the
verge of retirement have little time to adjust their saving, work, and portfo-
lios to offset potential capital and labor market losses. Furthermore, Baby
Boomers’ reactions are likely to differ according to individuals’ financial
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
wealth and human capital levels. To investigate possible outcomes, we
develop a life cycle model with optimal investment, work hours, retirement,
and annuitization decisions, allowing for shifts in the investment opportu-
nity set and labor income dynamics.
We build on two strands of literature in our analysis. One strand studies
how financial market downturns influence older workers’ consumption
decisions and retirement behavior. Hurd and Rohwedder (2012) as well
as Shapiro (2010) point out that the recent financial and economic crisis
significantly affected near-retirement households, which seem to have
reacted by reducing consumption and working longer. Yet Gustman et al.
(2010) estimate that retirement will only be postponed by 1.5 months on
average, given their simulations of a structural retirement model. Never-
theless, due to lack of data, these studies have focused primarily on older
persons near retirement and their short-run responses to the recent crises.
Thus, they do not explore the long-term impact of the crisis on younger age
groups, nor do they evaluate consequent changes in asset allocation behav-
ior. Our chapter examines these points as we seek to understand how
different age groups may adapt along several dimensions, as they react to
stock market downturns and unemployment risk.
A second relevant literature has explored household portfolio choice in
a discrete time life cycle model with risky capital market returns and
uninsurable labor income risk, asking how such uncertainty influences
saving, consumption, and asset allocation (Cocco et al., 2005). This litera-
ture was extended by Gomes et al. (2008) to include flexible hours;
subsequent work by Chai et al. (2011) also incorporated flexible retirement
and Social Security, as well as the option to annuitize one’s wealth. A key
lesson from this research is that well-being is greatly enhanced when labor
effort is adjustable. Nevertheless, these papers assumed that permanent
labor income shocks and risky asset returns were independently and iden-
tically distributed over time, while there is now clear empirical evidence
refuting this assumption. For instance, Guidolin and Timmerman (2008)
show that expected stock market returns and volatility vary both over time
and across bull–bear states. That is, in some periods, equity returns are
characterized by persistently low volatility/high expected returns, whereas
in other periods, they are characterized by persistently high volatility/low
expected returns. Instead of focusing on stock returns, Carroll and Dunn
(1997) and Storesletten et al. (2004) estimate a regime-switching model of
labor market earnings; they find that the volatility of labor income in-
creases in recessions and falls in expansions.
In what follows, we combine the labor and stock market strands by
modeling both time-varying and persistent stock market and labor income
processes governed by a Markov chain for the business cycle. Here, some of
the time, asset returns are characterized by persistent regimes with an
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expansive capital market having low volatility/high expected return; in
other periods, a contractionary market is characterized by high volatility/
low expected returns. In addition, we model the countercyclical dynamics
of risky labor income using time-varying shocks on wage rates dynamics and
unemployment probabilities driven by the same regime-switching process.
Such a setting allows us to explore the situation where a financial sector
crisis may also produce an economic crisis (with a time lag), driving high
unemployment and lower earnings. In this way, we seek to show how these
simultaneous shocks alter retirement, work hours, and consumption tra-
jectories; asset allocation patterns; and annuity purchases of younger and
elder households. In addition, we can cleanly illustrate the long-term
impact of the financial and economic crisis on behavior well into the
future. While it is too soon to actually observe how the crisis will alter
long-term behaviors, our model provides a useful set of predictions for
policy purposes.
Our results indicate that some will be able to hedge adverse capital
market developments they face in the crisis, not only by altering their
asset allocations but also by altering their work hours and retirement
ages. In particular, we find that when hit by a financial and economic crisis,
households near retirement must cut their consumption both in the short-
term and also over the long-term. Moreover, they will have to increase their
work effort and postpone retirement. These short-term results correspond
to the recent empirical findings noted above. For young cohorts, short-
term effects differ from those in the long run. During the first five years
after the onset of the crisis, young households will reduce work hours,
saving, and equity exposure, and suffer from a drop in consumption. In
the long run, however, they will work more, retire later, invest more in
stocks, consume less, save more, and spend less on private annuities. These
predictions illustrate the key dimensions along which economic adjust-
ment are likely to occur, in response to the most severe recession since
the Great Depression.
The framework
Labor and capital markets
We take as a starting point the presence of dual regimes in capital and labor
market dynamics driven by the business cycle. Accordingly, stock returns and
labor earnings are modeled as subject to a business cycle governed by a
Markov chain process that, following the NBER classification, has two states:
expansion and contraction. The variable st indicates whether at time t the
economy is in a state of expansion (st = 0) or contraction (st = 1). Transition
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probabilities between the two business cycle (BC) states are constant over
time and defined as pBCi;j :¼ Pðstþ1 ¼ j jst ¼ iÞ (i.e. pBCi;j denotes the probabil-
ity that at time t + 1 the economy will be in state j, given that the economy
is in state i at time t). Hence, pBC0;1 represents the probability that state
0 (expansion) will be followed by state 1 (contraction). The unconditional
probability for state expansion (st = 0) is given by ð1 pBC0;0Þ=ð2 pBC0;0  pBC1;1Þ
and for contraction (st = 1) by ð1 pBC1;1Þ=ð2 pBC0;0  pBC1;1Þ, respectively. Inwhat
follows, we assume that investors can observe st and know the state transition
probabilities pBCi;j at time t.
Next, we characterize what we mean by regime shifts in the labor income
process, allowing for unemployment risk and state-dependent wage
rate dynamics. The worker faces a risk of being unemployed in the period
[t, t + 1], where the probability of unemployment pUs is state-dependent and
specified as:
pUs : ¼ ðpU½t;tþ1jst ¼ iÞ ¼
pUi
pUj
with probability
pBCi;j
pBCi;i

The unemployment probability is lower in expansionary than in contrac-
tionary times (i.e. pU0 < p
U
1 ). At time t, the worker must decide what
fraction of time (1–Lt) to devote to employment. Lt stands for leisure and
is measured as a percentage of available time. In each period, if the
individual is not unemployed, he receives an after-tax disposable labor
income of
Y Es;tþ1 ¼ ð1 qtþ1Þð1 t1Þ WRs;tþ1ð1 LtÞ ð1Þ
at time t + 1, where qt + 1 is the age-dependent deterministic tax-deductible
fraction of labor income spent on housing and other durable goods, t1 is a
proportional tax rate on labor income, and WRst ;tþ1 is the state-dependent
wage rate at time t + 1 (i.e. the income per hour of work effort). The wage
rate dynamic process consists of three components as follows:
WRs;tþ1 ¼ expðwtþ1ÞE s;tþ1Utþ1 ð2Þ
Here, wtþ1 is a deterministic age-dependent function of wage rates that
allows us to capture the shape of various empirically observed earnings
profiles,1 and Ut + 1 is a state-independent transitory income shock
whose logarithm is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation sU . In addition,
Es;tþ1 ¼ Es;tns;tþ1 is a permanent labor earnings component. The logarithm
of the permanent income shock ns;tþ1 is drawn from a Gaussian mixture
distribution, with mean zero and standard deviation sn;s changing across
the two phases of the business cycle. Formally:
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lnðns;tþ1Þ : ¼

lnðntþ1Þjst ¼ i

 N ð0; sn;iÞ
N ð0; sn;jÞwith probability
pBCi;i
pBCi;j
:

To capture countercyclical labor income risk, we set sn;0 < sn;1 such that
the volatility in an expansion (st = 0) is lower than in a contractionary
period (st = 1).
2 We also allow for unemployment compensation payments
at time t +1 worth a specific fraction ı∈ ð0; 1Þ of labor income
(i.e. YUs;tþ1 ¼ ı Y Es;tþ1Þ.
In later life, we take the US Social Security system into account and allow
for a flexible retirement age. According to Social Security Administration
(SSA) rules, the worker may elect to claim Social Security benefits in the
window [62, 70] bounded by the ‘early’ retirement age (ERA) and the late
retirement age (LRA). The actual normal retirement age (NRA) is set for
this chapter at age 65. If the worker claims prior to the NRA, he receives a
permanently reduced benefit. Otherwise, the Social Security benefit is
increased by the delayed retirement credit. To capture this feature, we
calculate the after-tax Social Security benefits as in Chai et al. (2011):
Yt ¼ ð1 qtÞð1 tr Þ
XK
t¼1
ð1 LÞexpðwðtÞÞ=k
#
EK zFt;NRA
"
ð3Þ
where Ft;NRA ¼ expðg1ðNRA  tÞÞIðtNRAÞ þ expðg2ðNRA  tÞÞIðt>NRAÞ. Here,
we assume that when people claim retirement benefits they also consume
full leisure simultaneously (as in Chai et al., 2011).3 In this way,  is the
endogenous retirement age and z is the Social Security replacement rate
based on lifetime average earnings, and 1 L stands for the average fraction
of available time worked during the work life. The worker’s average lifetime
earnings level is approximated by
XK
t¼1
ð1 LÞ exp ðwðtÞÞ=KEK , where K denotes
when the individual attains her normal retirement age under the Social
Security rules (NRA). Retirement benefits are taxed at a rate t r. I is an indi-
cator function identifying whether the individual retires at/prior to the NRA,
or later. Ft;NRA is a factor which depends on the NRA and the endogenous
retirement age . g1 and g2 are positive constants.
Capital markets include two liquid assets—riskless bonds and risky
stocks—and illiquid deferred and immediate fixed payout life annuities.
The real bond gross return Rf is state-independent and constant over
time, while there is a time-varying investment opportunity set in the
stock market. Given a specific state st = i at time t, the risky real log-
return on stocks lnðRs;tþ1Þ over the period [t, t + 1] is drawn from Gaussian
mixture distribution with state-dependent mean  s and standard deviation
ss, formally:
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lnðRs;tþ1Þ :¼

lnðR½t;tþ1Þjst ¼ i

 N ðmi ; siÞ
N ðmj ; sjÞ with probability
pBCi;i
pBCi;j
:

ð4Þ
Each period, investors can observe the state of the economy at time t, but
the actual probability distribution of returns on stock investments in each
period depends on the (unknown) state of the economy at time t + 1. The
(state-dependent) correlation between shocks to permanent earnings and
stock market returns is denoted by çs.
In addition to stocks and bonds, the investor can, prior to the NRA,
purchase fixed payout deferred annuities that provide lifelong payments
commencing at the NRA. From that point onward, she can purchase
additional immediate life annuities. Annuity prices are calculated based
on actuarial principles. For a deferred life annuity paying yearly benefits of
one from NRA on, the premium is calculated as
ht ¼ð1þdÞ
 YNRA2
u¼t
pau

R
ðNRA1tÞ
f
XTNRA
m¼1
 YNRA1þm
u¼K1
pau

Rmf ; t <NRA ð5Þ
where pau are the survival probabilities based on the insurer’s annuitant
mortality table and d is the expense loading factor. Accordingly, the pre-
mium for an additional immediate life annuity purchased after the NRA is
given by
ht ¼ ð1þ dÞ
XT1
m¼1
Ytþm
u¼t
pau

Rmf ; t  NRA ð6Þ
To account for adverse selection, the survival probabilities pau used in
pricing the annuities are typically higher than those of the overall
population.
The consumer’s life cycle problem
To explore how households might respond to these financial/economic
and individual crises, we integrate the decisions to optimally select con-
sumption and saving, asset allocation, work effort and retirement age,
and annuitization paths over the life cycle. We posit that our individual
faces an uncertain life span and can live for a maximum of T years.
Her preferences are characterized by a time-additive CRRA utility function
uðCt ;LtÞ ¼ ½1=ð1 rÞðCtLat Þ1r defined over the level of nondurable
consumption Ct and leisure Lt at time t. After retirement, work hours are
equal to 0 and leisure is equal to 1. The value function is given by
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Vt ¼ ðCtL
a
t Þ1r
1 r þ bEtðp
p
t Vtþ1Þ ð7Þ
with terminal utility VT ¼ ðCTLaT Þ1r=ð1 rÞ. The parameter ppt denotes
the subjective probability of surviving to time t + 1, given the consumer
is alive at t. The parameter æ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and
b < 1 is the time preference. Leisure preferences are governed by the
parameter a.
Each period, the consumer decides how to allocate her cash on hand Wt
to bonds Bt, stocks St, annuity purchases At, and consumption Ct. Her
budget constraint is therefore:
Wt ¼ St þ Bt þ At þ Ct ð8Þ
and next period’s wealth Wt + 1 is given by
Wtþ1 ¼
ðStRs;tþ1þBtRf Þð1 tcÞþ tcðBt þStÞþYtþ1 t <NRA
ðStRs;tþ1þBtRf Þð1 tcÞþ tcðBt þStÞþPtþ1þYtþ1 t NRA: ð9Þ
Here, Pt+1 is the sum of annuity income received from any previously
purchased annuities. Before retirement, Yt +1 represents labor income,
and afterwards, it represents Social Security benefits. The recursive evolu-
tion equation for the sum of after-tax payout claims at time t from all
previous annuities purchased can be written as:4
PNRAtþ1 ¼ Pt þ
At
ht
  ðRf  1Þð1 tcÞ þ 1
Rf
where At/ht refers to the additional annuity payment purchased in t.
5 We
prevent households from borrowing against human capital and from sell-
ing annuities. These restrictions are binding, because otherwise house-
holds would engage in highly leveraged stock positions financed by short
positions in bonds and/or annuities in order to compensate for their
overinvestment in human capital when young. Thus, in every year, the
optimal policy has to satisfy Ct, St, Bt, At  0. Moreover, we posit that in
order to participate in the stock market, the household has to be willing
and able to invest a minimum amount in stocks (as in Smetters and Chen,
2010). This amount is set to 10 percent of the permanent labor income
after taxes and housing expenditures.
The individual’s optimization problem is now to maximize utility as in
equation (7) with respect to her asset allocation between liquid bonds and
stocks, illiquid annuities, consumption, work hours, and the retirement
decision:
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max
Ct ;Lt ;St ;Bt ;At ;t∈½62;63;:::;70
Vt ð10Þ
Assuming that the consumer knows about the regimes governing the
business cycle, there are six state variables: cash on hand Wt, annuity
payouts from previously purchased annuities Pt, the permanent labor earn-
ings level Et, retirement age , the business cycle state s, and age t. To
reduce the problem by one state variable, we normalize the continuous
state variables cash on hand with the permanent labor earnings compo-
nent. Next, we discretize the (normalized) continuous state variables and
solve the optimization problem by backward induction.6
Model calibration
For the base case, preference parameters are set to standard values in the life
cycle literature: the coefficient of relative risk aversion is æ = 5 and the
discount factor b = 0.97. The leisure preference value a is set to 1.3. As
shown in Chai et al. (2011), this set of preference parameters is able to
reproduce central empirical facts, including the hump-shaped pattern of
work hours, the two peaks in retirement rates, the sizeable decline in con-
sumption at retirement, and low annuity take-ups of older households. The
one-period survival rates p
p
t entering the utility function are taken from the
US 1996 RP-2000 population tables for females; the life span ismodeled from
age 20 to 100 (T = 81). To estimate the business cycle transition matrix, we
takeUSGross National Product (GNP) growth from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) for 1929–2006 with Datastream data for the years 2007–8.7
A contraction (expansion) state occurs when the GNP growth rate was less
than (greater than) its sample periodmean (as in Storesletten et al., 2004). In
this way, we estimate the transition matrix to be of the following form:
0:68 0:32
0:32 0:68
 
.8 A process with such a transition matrix is more likely to stay
in the same state, rather than to move to the other state, since probabilities
p1,1 and p0,0 are greater than 0.5. The deterministic component of the wage
rate process follows Fehr et al. (2006), reflectingmiddle-income households,
and it is scaled to generate an average gross labor incomeof $20,000 at age 20.
In what follows, we assume an available time of 100 waking hours per week
and set theminimum leisure time to Lmin = 1/3; in other words, themaximal
labor supply is two-thirds of available time. The average labor supply 1 L
used to calculate Social Security benefits is equal to 0.4, which corresponds
with an average lifetime work effort of 40 hours per week.
We follow Storesletten et al. (2004) and set the cyclical dynamic labor
market risk sn;0ðsn;1Þ to 8.4 percent (15.9 percent) and the corresponding
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volatility of the transitory shock su to 32.9 percent.
9 The unemployment
probability in expansion (contraction) periods pU0 ðpU1 Þ is set to 5 percent
(10 percent). The parameter for unemployment compensation payments
is set to ı = 60 percent. The Social Security benefit structure is similar to
that in effect in the United States. The benefit replacement rate z is set to
0.52 (as per Mitchell and Phillips, 2006); the actuarial reduction rate for
early retirement benefits is g1 = 0.0713; the delayed retirement crediting
rate is g2 = 0.077; and the normal retirement age is 65, as in Buchinsky et al.
(2000) and Chai et al. (2011). Social Security benefits are taxed at a rate of
15 percent as in Gomes et al. (2008).10 Housing-related expenditures qt are
modeled, as in Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
The annual real value-weighted market index portfolio returns on the
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (from CRSP) from 1950 to 200811 are classi-
fied into two states which are identified by the GNP growth rate. Then the
regime-dependent parameters specifying the normal distribution of log
gross return are given as follows: m0 = 6.84 percent, s0 = 11.21 percent,
m1 = 2.12 percent, and s1 = 20.77 percent,
12,13 equivalent to a yearly
expected gross real return of 1.0775 and standard deviation of 12.12
percent in the expansion period, and 1.0437 and 21.91 percent in the
contraction phase. Here, the expansion–contraction economy tends to
coincide with a low/high-volatility, high/low-mean regime in the stock
market. This evidence is also be found in Gordon and St-Amour (2000),
Ang and Bekaert (2002), Kim and Lee (2007) and Guidolin and Timmer-
mann (2008). The correlation between stock returns and permanent and
transitory earnings shocks ç for both cases is set to zero, consistent with
empirical evidence provided by Cocco et al. (2005). The real riskless gross
return for bond investments is Rf = 1.02. To price the life annuities, future
benefits are discounted with the riskless return. The conditional survival
probabilities pat are taken from the US 1996 female annuitant RP-2000
mortality table to account for potential adverse selection in the voluntary
annuity market. The expense loading factor d is set to 2.38 percent, a
number in line with industry leaders such as Vanguard. Returns on assets
are assumed to be taxed at 20 percent; labor earnings are taxed at 30
percent following Gomes et al. (2008).
For the average household aged 55, we estimate a wealth-to-income ratio
of 9, which approximately represents the median of the wealth distribution.
To this end, we draw on wealth data from Gustman et al. (2010), and
income data from the SSA. Specifically, we employed the distribution of
assets by wealth deciles in 2006 for households with at least one member
born from 1948 to 1953, defining wealth as total wealth net of Social
Security and defined benefit pension wealth. To estimate median labor
income for households aged 55, we use SSA data on the median income of
nonmarried persons aged 65–69 in the year 2006. We match labor income
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profiles estimated by Storesletten et al. (2004) to this income data and
calculate the income at age 55 based on those profiles. Moreover, we
assume that households aged 55 have not yet purchased any annuities.
Results
Having solved the life cycle problem for the optimal policies (consump-
tion, asset allocation, work hours, saving, and retirement behavior), next
we evaluate the distribution of decision variables based on a Monte Carlo
simulation of 100,000 life cycle trajectories, differentiating between two
general economic and financial scenarios: crisis and normalcy.
Identifying the tails of the financial/economic distribution
Here, we characterize a financial/economic crisis as one where the economy is
in the contraction state for four years in a row, and in addition, in the first
year the stock return is a 30 percent. By contrast, a normal financial and
economic environment, which we treat as the baseline scenario, is defined
as one in which no additional exogenous restrictions are imposed on the
state of the business cycle or the stock market performance. Hence, the
initial state of the business cycle is determined by the (unconditional) long-
run state probabilities and the states in subsequent periods by the condi-
tional state transition probabilities, while stock market returns are gov-
erned by the business cycle, state-specific distributions as described above.
In addition to this general analysis using the whole simulation sample, we
are also keenly interested in the distributional tails. We examine these by
analyzing subsamples of those 100,000 life cycles, as not all households may
be affected similarly by the business cycle; some perform exceptionally well,
while others who experience unemployment and persistent wage shocks
fare far worse. Accordingly, we stipulate that an individual suffers from a
‘triple whammy’ if he/she experiences a financial/economic crisis at the
beginning of the analysis, is unemployed in at least two of the first four
years thereafter, and also suffers from below-first-quartile cumulated stock
market returns until age 62, when he becomes eligible for Social Security
benefits. By contrast, we define a doubly fortunate individual as someone that
never experiences a financial/economic crisis, is never unemployed to age
62, and experiences above-average capital market returns to age 62 with
cumulated stock returns in the top 25 percentile.
In what follows, we differentiate between the short- and long-term effects
of the financial/economic crisis on households’ behavior and well-being.
While short-term effects can be studied using already available empirical
data, sample data on the crisis’ long-term effects will obviously not be
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available for several decades. For this reason, model simulations are the
only way to make predictions about what future outcomes might be. Of
particular interest in this context is how different cohorts are influenced
by, and react to, the economic/financial crisis. While over the short run
both younger and elder cohorts could be substantially affected by the crisis,
due to their longer remaining period of economic activity, younger people
might suffer less in the long run than do elder generations. To explore this
outcome, we conduct our analyses for households that are hit by a finan-
cial/economic crisis at ages 20 and 55. For the cohort aged 20 (55), out of
the 100,000 sample paths, we identify 933 (979) that qualify for the double
fortune scenario and 1,321 (1,355) that comply with the triple whammy
scenario.
Short-term effects
We next turn our attention to the impacts of and the reaction to an
economic/financial crisis over the short run, which in this study we define
to cover a period of a decade. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 depict the effects for
households initially aged 20 or 55 on key decision variables: expected work
hours (Panel A), consumption (Panel B), saving/withdrawal (i.e. labor
income/Social Security benefits after taxes and housing expenditures
minus consumption, Panel C), and stock investment (Panel D). Here, the
solid black line presents absolute values for the normal scenario (left axis),
while the bars show relative deviations from the base case results for three
alternative scenarios: crisis (black), double fortune (pattern), and triple
whammy (white) on the right axis.
Short-term effects for the younger cohort
In the base case scenario, the work effort of a young individual exceeds 40
hours per week, with average work effort starting at 47 hours per week at
age 20 and then rising further to above 51 hours in the mid-20s (Figure 7.1,
Panel A). Long and rising work hours, combined with a wage rate increas-
ing with age and experience, generate high and rising labor income. This
allows the individual to increase consumption from $9,000 at age 20 to
about $14,000 in the mid-20s (Panel B). At the same time, periodic savings
more than double from $1,600 to about $3,700 (Panel C). At age 20, the
household will on average invest about 65 percent of liquid funds accumu-
lated in stocks and increase this fraction over the following six years to
almost 100 percent (Panel D). The young household seeks high stock
fractions due to the rather bond-like nature of labor income. Yet the
minimum required investment amount for participating in the stock
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market results in stock fractions falling short of 100 percent early in the life
cycle, as sufficient funds must first be accumulated. Once a sufficient
amount of liquid assets has been saved, the investor then maximizes equity
exposure. With wage rates increasing even further and invested funds
starting to generate measurable returns, the individual can afford to
enjoy more leisure by already slightly reducing work hours in his late 20s,
initiating the oft-cited hump shape in work effort. Both consumption and
periodic saving increase further to about $17,400 and $4,100 by age 30.
When we compare this baseline to a young household experiencing a
financial and economic crisis at age 20, work effort proves to be virtually
identical as a result of two offsetting effects. The crisis lowers wage rates
resulting from higher unemployment probabilities, leaving the individual
less inclined to work and more likely to consume leisure (by the substitu-
tion effect). Yet, lower income provides less consumption opportunity,
which induces greater work effort (by the income effect). As work effort
does not rise beyond base case, the individual compensates for his income
drop by reducing both consumption and saving. Moreover, these reduc-
tions persist over the next decade even if the economy eventually recovers;
consumption drops by 2 percent and periodic saving by 2–3 percent com-
pared to the normal scenario. Not yet having accumulated financial assets,
the young individual does not suffer from the 30 percent downturn in the
stock market at the beginning of the financial and economic crisis, so his
stock holdings are hardly affected, only dropping slightly (2.5 percent) in
the first two years.
By comparison, a young worker hit by a triple whammy will substantially
reduce work effort. His hours worked per week drop by almost 10 percent
in the first two years, compared to the base case, after which they slowly rise
again. The corresponding drop in income drives a consumption decline of
about 15 percent over the first four years. Periodic saving is even more
affected, dropping by more than 60 percent for a worker in his early 20s.
Having so few liquid assets, the worker cannot afford to participate in the
stock market, and overall stock fractions drop by 10–20 percent during the
first five years (from a low base). After four years’ time, as the initial crisis
wanes, the individual strives to recover by increasing work effort above that
in the base case over the second half of the decade. While consumption
again converges toward the base case level, even at age 30, it remains about
2 percent less than in the normal scenario. At the same time, the household
seeks to replenish accumulated funds by saving between 10 and 20 percent
more than the baseline investor from the mid- through late-20s. Once
sufficient funds have been built up again, the household can then afford
to invest in equities, and stock holdings converge to those in the normal
scenario from the mid-20s.
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Panel A. Expected work hours
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Panel B. Expected consumption
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Figure 7.1 Short-term effects of financial/economic crises on young cohort (age
20). Panel (A): expected work hours; Panel (B): expected consumption; Panel (C):
expected saving/withdrawal; Panel (D): expected stock investment
Notes: Panel C: labor income/Social Security benefits after taxes and housing expenditures
minus consumption. Solid black line (left axis): absolute values under normal scenario. Bars
(right axis): relative deviations from normal case for alternative scenarios: crisis (black),
double fortune (pattern), triple whammy (white).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Panel C. Expected saving/withdrawal
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Panel D. Expected stock investment
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Finally, the doubly fortunate are even inclined to work slightly more in the
early 20s than our baseline households, which enables them to consume
about 2–3 percent more; this is the result of never being unemployed and
not confronting a financial/economic crisis. Additionally, these individuals
save substantially more, which increases their ability to early invest in stocks.
With above-average labor income and capital market performance, they
can reduce their work effort even more than the baseline households in
their late 20s, while still being able to afford 2–3 percent higher
consumption.
Short-term effects for the near-retirement cohort
Next, we turn to our attention to the cohort looking ahead to retirement,
initially age 55. In the baseline scenario, people reduce their work effort
into their late 50s and early 60s, following the conventional hump-shape
work pattern. At age 55, on average, they still engage in near full-time
employment, but work hours per week gradually taper to 20 by age 65
(Figure 7.2, Panel A). As in the case of the younger cohorts, older people
who experience the financial/economic crisis maintain a virtually identical
work effort path.
The picture changes, however, when looking at households hit by the
triple whammy. The near-retirement cohort—with a shorter period of
economic activity remaining—must compensate for reductions in wage
rates and wealth by immediately increasing work hours. (It will be recalled
that the younger cohort can work less, counting on a longer time horizon
over which it can recover income losses.) Consequently, older persons’
work effort rises by around 10 percent relative to the base case, and in their
60s, the difference is greater, about 25 percent. Sensibly, the doubly fortu-
nate workers cash in on their luck in both the labor and capital markets by
substantially reducing work effort sooner.
In the base case, the older cohort consumes about $30,000 per year on
average, or two to three times the consumption of households in their 20s.
This consumption level is financed, to a large extent, by drawing down
liquid financial assets (Figure 7.2, Panels B and C). Those older persons
beset by a financial/economic crisis reduce annual consumption by
around 4 percent per year from age 55 to 65, and annual withdrawals fall
by about 2–3 percent. Those hit by a triple whammy experience substantial
and persistent reductions in annual consumption of about 10 percent
compared to the base case. Early in the crisis, workers seek to maintain
consumption by withdrawing almost 30 percent more from liquid assets,
compared to the base case. As financial wealth was already heavily battered
due to the stock market downturn at the beginning of the crisis, these high
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withdrawals can only be maintained over a short period. Subsequently,
withdrawals must be reduced by 30 percent more than the base case
between the late 50s and mid-60s. Consumption can only be maintained
by substantially increasing work effort.
In our base case, as is typical in life cycle models, the fraction of financial
wealth invested in stocks, around 80 percent in the mid-50s, is below that
early in working life, but it slightly increases again toward retirement age as
the worker’s exposure to labor market shocks declines. Given a financial/
economic crisis, equity exposure falls short of the base case value by over 20
percent during the first four years; thereafter, after the initial crisis is over,
stock fractions again converge. For those hit by the triple whammy, the
change in the stock fraction compared to the base case traces out an S-
shape. Early in the crisis, stock allocations drop by about 10 percent, but
from the late 50s it exceeds that of base case households by about 10
percent. Anticipating a high probability of poor stock market performance
in the following period, the household is less inclined to hold equities over
the first years of the crisis. Later, the remaining low financial wealth pro-
vides incentives to gamble and invest more in the stock market. Finally,
doubly fortunate workers have persistently lower stock fractions over the
entire period under scrutiny. Having accumulated high financial wealth
allows the household to invest more conservatively.
In sum, for both younger and older cohorts, the financial/economic
crisis has hardly any short-term impact on work effort on average. But a
subset of people fares far worse, including near-retirees hit by a triple
whammy who face a hostile labor market environment and also suffer
substantial losses in financial wealth. Since they only have a few work
years available to adjust to these shocks, they must immediately and
significantly increase their work effort after being unemployed. By con-
trast, those hit at the beginning of their work lives must optimally reduce
work hours in the less favorable labor market environment. The same
conclusion holds for consumption on average: the impact of the finan-
cial/economic crisis is comparable for younger versus older cohorts. Yet,
older households hit by the triple whammy experience persistent con-
sumption shortfalls, which are mitigated for the younger cohort where
consumption converges to the base case level in time. The same holds for
saving at young ages and withdrawals near retirement. And most striking
is the difference in household allocations to stocks. Near-retirees have
already accumulated financial wealth, and hence are more vulnerable to
equity fluctuations, while the young have accumulated little in the way of
financial assets. For this reason, the financial/economic crisis has little
impact on the young, but near-retirees will optimally cut their equity
exposure by over 20 percent during the crisis. This depends on the
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Panel A. Expected work hours
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Figure 7.2 Short-term effects of financial/economic crises on near-retirement
cohort (age 55). Panel (A): expected work hours; Panel (B): expected consump-
tion; Panel (C): expected saving/withdrawal; Panel (D): expected stock investment
Notes: Panel (C): labor income/Social Security benefits after taxes and housing expenditures
minus consumption. Solid black line (left axis): absolute values under normal scenario. Bars
(right axis): relative deviations from normal case for alternative scenarios: crisis (black),
double fortune (pattern), triple whammy (white).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
136 Reshaping Retirement Security
Panel C. Expected saving/withdrawal
Panel D. Expected stock investment
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nature of the shock, however, since near-retirees hit by the triple
whammy will invest more in stock, hoping to hit high returns.
Long-term effects
Next, we turn our attention to the impacts of and the reaction to an
economic/financial crisis in the long run (i.e. over the remaining lifecycle).
Findings are presented in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 and Tables 7.1–7.4. Figure 7.3
depicts expected work hours (Panel A), consumption (Panel B), and saving/
withdrawal (i.e. labor income/Social Security benefits after taxes and hous-
ing expenditures minus consumption, Panel C) for the younger cohort.
Again, the black line presents absolute values for the baseline or normal
scenario (left axis), while the bars show relative deviations from the base case
for the alternative scenarios (right axis): crisis (black), double fortune (pat-
tern), and triple whammy (white). Panel C distinguishes between saving
(solid black line) and withdrawal (i.e. negative saving dashed black line).
Figure 7.4 presents consumption (Panel A) and withdrawal (Panel B) for the
near-retirement cohort. Work hours for this cohort are omitted as house-
holds in this cohort will all have retired over the longer run. Tables 7.1 and
7.2 show retirement behavior for both cohorts and Tables 7.3 and 7.4 pres-
ent their long-term asset allocations.
Long-term effects for the younger cohort
Looking at the cohort of persons first experiencing a shock at age 20, it is
clear that patterns that already emerged in the later years of our short-term
analysis of work effort continue to persist over the longer run (Figure 7.3,
Panel A). Our base case household in a normal scenario will gradually
reduce weekly work hours from about 50 at age 30, to around 25 by age 60.
As in the short-term case, the long-term effects of the financial/economic
crisis on work effort are negligible. By contrast, doubly fortunate house-
holds reduce their level of work effort below that of base case households,
by about 10 percent at age 45, and 20 percent at age 55. Those hit by the
triple whammy, however, must boost work hours substantially compared to
the base case, by about 10 percent at age 50, and 20 percent at age 60.
Hence, work effort at these ages is still as high as that of base case house-
holds that are five years younger.
Turning to lifetime effects on consumption (Panel B, Figure 7.3), we
find that under the normal scenario, consumption grows to age 60 and
peaks at an annual $30,500. Subsequently, households start to retire and
substitute less goods consumption with more leisure time consumption.14
Doubly fortunate households can substantially increase their consumption
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level relative to the normal scenario, by 17 percent during their 70s and still
by 15 percent at age 90. Crisis households, however, experience a persistent
consumption reduction of 2 percent, and those going through a triple
whammy have 3 percent shortfalls over their work lives. Though the latter
are surely financially worse off, due to poor capital market performance,
they can maintain much of their consumption by working more. Later in
life, however, they lose this flexibility and hence suffer from higher con-
sumption shortfalls, of around 10 percent at age 70.
Wealth patterns are also different. Base case households continue to
build up financial wealth until their 40s (Figure 7.3, Panel C); from their
50s onward, they begin drawing down assets to pay for high and still
increasing consumption while already reducing work effort. Apparently,
as consumption reaches its peak at age 60, so do withdrawals with a
maximum value of $12,500 per annum. A worker who started his work
life crisis will save about 4 percent less than base case households by age 30;
over the next decade, he must boost saving to ensure sufficient financial
reserves for the withdrawal phase, so by age 40, saving exceeds that of base
case households by about 5 percent. Later in the life cycle, withdrawals are
similar to the normal scenario. Doubly fortunate households can afford to
save less and withdraw more than the base case household due to their
above-average labor and capital market performance. For those experien-
cing the triple whammy, obviously, the opposite is true and they have to
save more and invest less.
Table 7.1 depicts how the younger cohort allocates financial wealth to
liquid stocks and bonds, as well as to illiquid life annuities over the life
cycle. First, in the normal scenario, we see a typical stock fraction path over
the life cycle. The young household is almost fully invested in stocks by
age 30, and over time he reduces equity exposure near retirement to well
below 80 percent. Initially, stocks are substituted by bonds which make up
about 20 percent of the portfolio by age 50. As the survival credit and,
hence, the excess return of annuities over bonds increases with household
age, annuities start to crowd out bonds, making up about 14 percent of the
portfolio by age 70. At older ages, the individual gradually depletes his
liquid financial wealth and lowers his stock fraction to 34 percent by age 80;
the share of annuities in the allocation of overall financial wealth increases
to about half. Even at age 80, the investor optimally holds over 16 percent
of financial wealth in bonds, despite the fact that annuities substantially
outperform liquid bond holdings. The reason is that, as liquid assets are
consumed, it becomes more and more difficult for the household to meet
the minimum requirement on stock investments. Accordingly, bonds
increasingly represent the only sensible liquid asset held by the household.
Comparing the crisis setting to our base case scenario, we find hardly any
differences, indicating that the long-term effects of the crisis on workers’
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Panel B. Expected consumption
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Figure 7.3 Long-term effects of financial/economic crises on young cohort
(age 20). Panel (A): expected work hours; Panel (B): expected consumption;
Panel (C): expected saving/withdrawal
Notes : Panel (C): labor income/Social Security benefits after taxes and housing expenditures
minus consumption. Solid black line (axis on the left): absolute values under normal scenario.
Bars (axis on the right): relative deviations from normal case for alternative scenarios: crisis
(black), double fortune (pattern), triple whammy (white).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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asset allocations are negligible when the impact strikes young, as these
individuals lack financial assets. By contrast, experiencing the triple
whammy young does have a lifelong impact. Young workers with very low
financial wealth have only one major asset, their bond-like human capital,
so they are much more likely to hold more stock over their lifetimes. In
their 60s, for example, they still invest over 85 percent of financial wealth in
equities. The opposite is true for the doubly fortunate households, who
invest less in equity over the whole life cycle. Their bond-like labor income
makes up a smaller part of their overall wealth, leading them to diversify by
shifting a higher share of financial wealth into less risky assets (i.e. bonds
earlier in life and later, annuities).
It is also of interest to ask how the crisis shapes retirement behavior.
Table 7.2 presents the fraction of households that retire from age 62 to 70
(retiring is defined by reducing work effort to below 20 hours per week).
The base case setting exhibits the empirically well-documented two-peaked
distribution: over one-quarter of households retires at the early retirement
age of 62, while around half retire later, at ages 66 and 67. By age 68, all
households have retired, and on average, retirement occurs at age 64.8.
Workers struck by the crisis at a young age have several decades to adjust,
and they make retirement timing decisions virtually identical to those of
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base case households (resulting in the same average retirement age). By
contrast, young workers experiencing a triple whammy when young must
work longer to make up the shortfall: three-quarters postpone retirement
beyond the normal retirement age, and on average they retire one year
later than the base case scenario, at age 65.8. Not surprisingly, half of the
doubly fortunate group retires as early as possible; 70 percent leave work
prior to normal retirement age, twice as high as in the base case, which
drives down the average retirement age by more than a year (to 63.5).
Long-term effects for the older cohort
Our base case households in the normal scenario consume about $31,000
at age 65 on average, and reduce their spending over the following two
decades to around $22,000. After that, consumption increases again
(Figure 7.4, Panel A). Being exposed to a financial/economic crisis leaves
Table 7.1 Long-term impacts of crisis on asset allocation of young
cohort (age 20)
Age (years) Asset allocation (%)
Average Tails
Normal Crisis Double fortune Triple whammy
Stocks
30 99.3 99.3 99.0 99.2
40 90.0 90.0 84.3 94.5
50 79.5 79.5 69.3 87.1
60 77.3 77.3 66.3 86.7
70 79.5 79.3 63.6 85.8
80 34.1 34.2 21.1 41.1
Bonds
30 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7
40 10.0 9.9 15.5 5.5
50 19.3 19.3 25.7 12.7
60 18.7 18.6 20.4 12.5
70 6.7 6.7 6.0 8.1
80 16.5 16.5 11.3 23.1
Annuities
30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
40 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
50 1.2 1.2 5.0 0.2
60 4.1 4.1 13.4 0.8
70 13.8 14.0 30.3 6.1
80 49.4 49.3 67.6 35.8
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Panel B. Expected withdrawal
–60
–40
–20
0
20
40
60
3,500
6,000
8,500
11,000
13,500
16,000
18,500
65 70 75 80 85 90
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 w
ith
dr
aw
al
 (
%
)
W
ith
dr
aw
al
 (
U
S
$)
Age
Panel A. Expected consumption
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Figure 7.4 Long-term effects of financial/economic crises on near-retirement
cohort (age 55). Panel (A): expected consumption; Panel (B): expected withdrawal
Notes: Panel (B): labor income/Social Security benefits after taxes and housing expenditures
minus consumption. Solid black line (axis on the left): absolute values under normal scenario.
Bars (axis on the right): relative deviations from normal case for alternative scenarios: crisis
(black), double fortune (pattern), triple whammy (white).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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households with lower financial wealth as well as lower Social Security
income. Consequently, retirement consumption falls short of that of base
case households by 4 percent per year. Households hit by the triple
whammy close to retirement suffer dramatically over the remaining life-
time, as consumption persistently drops by 11–18 percent. By contrast,
doubly fortunate households enjoy consumption that exceeds base case
levels by 8–15 percent. Consumption is predominantly financed through
constant Social Security income, to about 80 percent from age 75 on. The
remainder must be supported by withdrawals from financial wealth that,
consequently, exhibit the same temporal pattern as consumption, yet with
higher magnitude due to the base effect (Figure 7.4, Panel B).
Long-term asset allocation patterns for the older cohort appear in
Table 7.3. Under all scenarios, stock fractions decrease over time as the
household gradually depletes liquid financial wealth, from 80–95 percent
at age 65 to 24–38 percent at age 85. Bond fractions decline through the
60s, increase again through the 70s, and peak in the early 80s, when due to
diminishing liquid wealth, households increasingly face difficulties to
finance the minimum amount required to participate in the stock market.
To take advantage of the increasing survival credit, households gradually
shift financial wealth from liquid assets into annuities. When combined
with the depletion of liquid assets due to consumption-financing withdra-
wals, this drives annuity fractions up from 0.2–5 percent at age 65 to 45–64
percent at age 85. In general, compared to the base case calibration, the
allocation to liquid assets is marginally higher under the crisis scenario and
substantially higher for triple whammy households. The asset allocation of
Table 7.2 Crisis impact on retirement behavior of young cohort (age 20)
Age (years) Retirement ratio (%)
Average Tails
Normal Crisis Double fortune Triple whammy
62 27.4 27.4 53.9 8.0
63 6.3 6.2 8.8 3.6
64 6.6 6.5 7.3 5.5
65 8.2 8.2 5.1 8.8
66 24.6 24.5 12.6 36.3
67 22.3 22.3 9.9 32.7
68 4.7 4.8 2.1 5.1
69 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average
retirement age
64.8 64.8 63.5 65.8
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Table 7.4 Crisis impact on retirement behavior of near-retirement cohort (age 55)
Age (years) Retirement ratio (%)
Average Tails
Normal Crisis Double fortune Triple whammy
62 20.6 18.2 40.6 4.4
63 7.0 7.4 9.3 3.3
64 7.0 8.1 9.1 3.2
65 9.0 9.5 8.7 10.2
66 26.8 26.8 16.6 38.2
67 24.4 24.7 13.0 33.2
68 5.1 5.4 2.8 7.5
69 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average
retirement age
65.08 65.15 64.02 66.04
Note : Fractions of households that retire at specific age. Definition of retirement: work effort
reduced to below 20 hours per week.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
Table 7.3 Long-term impacts of crisis on asset allocation of near-retirement cohort
(age 55)
Age (years) Asset allocation (%)
Average Tails
Normal Crisis Double fortune Triple whammy
Stocks
30 99.3 99.3 99.0 99.2
40 90.0 90.0 84.3 94.5
50 79.5 79.5 69.3 87.1
60 77.3 77.3 66.3 86.7
70 79.5 79.3 63.6 85.8
80 34.1 34.2 21.1 41.1
Bonds
30 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7
40 10.0 9.9 15.5 5.5
50 19.3 19.3 25.7 12.7
60 18.7 18.6 20.4 12.5
70 6.7 6.7 6.0 8.1
80 16.5 16.5 11.3 23.1
Annuities
30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
40 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
50 1.2 1.2 5.0 0.2
60 4.1 4.1 13.4 0.8
70 13.8 14.0 30.3 6.1
80 49.4 49.3 67.6 35.8
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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doubly fortunate households, on the other hand, is characterized by lower
stock and higher annuity fractions.
Finally, Table 7.4 summarizes the impact of the financial/economic crisis
on retirement patterns of the older cohort. In the baseline case, the average
retirement age is 65.1; one-fifth of all households (20.6 percent) retire at
the early retirement age 62; about half (51 percent) at age 66–67; and the
remainder (5.1 percent) at age 68. In the crisis scenario, the fraction of
households retiring at the early retirement age drops by 2.4 percent, and
that of households retiring prior to the normal retirement age of 65 drops
by a mere 0.4 percent; this produces a tiny increase in the average retire-
ment age of only 0.07 years (a little less than a month). Things are very
different for those individuals who experienced the triple whammy: almost
90 percent cannot afford to retire before the normal retirement age, which
drives up the average retirement age by one year compared to the normal
scenario. Two of five doubly fortunate households retire at the early retire-
ment age, and three of five retire prior to the normal retirement age;
consequently, the average retirement age falls by about one year compared
to the base case scenario. Under all scenarios, the latest retirement age is 68.
Conclusion
Our goal was to investigate the short- and long-term impacts of a combined
financial and economic crisis on households at different stages in their life
cycles. To this end, we have developed a life cycle model that allows for
optimal consumption, work effort, retirement, asset allocation, and annui-
tization decisions, incorporating countercyclical labor income and unem-
ployment risk, as well as regime shifts in the investment opportunity set. We
show that for young households, the financial/economic crisis will have
little impact on either work effort or retirement behavior, though they do
suffer from a long-term decline in annual consumption accompanied by
lower saving. Stock fractions are marginally lower at the onset of the crisis,
but over the remaining life cycle, asset allocation does not change much.
Young households hit particularly badly by the financial/economic crisis
do have more response, reducing their work effort during the crisis by up
to 10 percent; later in life, they must boost work hours substantially—over
20 percent at age 60 compared to the noncrisis scenario, and must defer
retirement by one year on average. Lifetime consumption is also lower: in
their early 20s, it is about 15 percent less, and 5 percent less even after age
70. The other effect is that young households must save substantially more
than noncrisis households later in life, to build up at least some financial
wealth. Low savings early in life go hand in hand with low stock investment;
thereafter, from about age 40 on, equity exposure is continuously higher
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than that of noncrisis households, while both bond investments and annu-
ity purchases are reduced.
When older persons are hit by a combined financial and economic crisis,
they are predicted to boost work effort slightly, around 0.3–1.3 percent,
over the rest of their work lives. Moreover, their average retirement age
rises slightly as well (less than one month). The crisis is felt, instead, in
more marked declines in annual consumption, both short- and long-term.
Compared to a noncrisis scenario, consumption drops by 3.5 percent
before retirement and by around 4.5 percent after age 80. Households
reduce their asset withdrawals by about 2.5 percent over the short run and
by about 9 percent later in life. During the immediate crisis, households
reduce their equity exposure by more than 20 percent, on average, in favor
of risk-free bonds. Over the longer run, however, investors have a margin-
ally higher appetite for liquid assets, both stocks and bonds, than investors
in a noncrisis scenario. Consequently, the level of annuitization decreases.
Those older households hit especially badly by unemployment and stock
market shocks must substantially boost their work effort, by over 20 percent
in their early 60s. Moreover, they cannot afford to retire early and must
postpone retirement by about one year, on average.15 Yet, they still experi-
ence consumption losses of about 10 percent in the short-term and about
15 percent later in life. While they are able to dampen the immediate
impacts of the crisis through an increase in withdrawal of financial assets
(about 30 percent at age 55), the corresponding drop in financial wealth
results in substantial cuts in withdrawals later in life (more than 40 percent
from age 70). These households reduce their equity exposure only by 10
percent early in the crisis. Over the remaining life cycle, allocation to stocks
is substantially higher than that of households in the noncrisis scenarios.
Our predictions that older households must curtail their consumption,
boost work effort, and defer retirement correspond to recent evidence on
short-term effects of the crisis on older individuals (Gustman et al., 2010;
Shapiro, 2010; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2012). For younger cohorts, on the
other hand, there are (to the best of our knowledge) no empirical studies
on how they are responding to the crisis in the short term. And for obvious
reasons, it will take years to trace out how the crisis will influence long-term
work, saving, consumption, and investment behavior. Our research offers a
valuable means for informing policymakers about how such crises can
differentially influence household responses to economic shocks, as they
deploy the adjustment mechanisms at their disposal. Based on the frame-
work provided, subsequent work can evaluate how policy changes might
enhance well-being in the face of such crises; for instance, by making the
retirement process more versus less flexible, supporting annuitization of
retirement assets, or by changing retirement ages under Social Security.
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Endnotes
1. Bosworth et al. (2000) report that middle-class workers are likely to have hump-
shaped earnings profiles.
2. Carroll and Dunn (1997) and Storesletten et al. (2004) show that permanent
labor income risk is strongly countercyclical.
3. Coile et al. (2001) show that a vast majority of workers claim and also stop
working at the same juncture. In what follows, we abstract from other Social
Security rules such as the earnings test for a retiree who returns to work before
the normal retirement age, but after claiming benefits.
4. We assume that the annuities are held in nontax-qualified accounts and interest
earnings are taxed as capital gains. Chai et al. (2011) show that this is a
reasonable approximation to the exclusion ratio approach implemented by
the US tax authority, and we adopt it here for greater computational tractability
(also following Brown et al., 1999).
5. Prior to the retirement period, this state variable records the amount of payouts
starting from the normal retirement age (NRA), from all previously purchased
deferred annuities. After the NRA, this state variable denotes the sum of
payouts from previously purchased immediate and deferred annuities.
6. For computations, we use a grid of dimension 40(W)  30(P)  2(s)  42(t)
before and 40(W)  30(P)  2(s)  39(t)  9() after the ERA. For each grid
point, we evaluate the policy and value functions using Gaussian quadrature
integration and cubic-splines interpolation.
7. See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm
8. Storesletten et al. (2004) use the same transition matrix.
9. The volatility of the transitory shock is estimated by averaging the fixed effect
and measurement error from Storesletten et al. (2004).
10. Future work can explore alternative tax structures in more detail; see also
Smetters and Chen (2010).
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11. The US Consumer Price Index (CPI) from Datastream for the years 1950–2008
is used to get the real number.
12. Over our sample period, the average realized equity premium was 5.73 percent.
As this is perceived to be too high (a result known as the equity premium
puzzle), we reduce the historical mean return estimate by 1.73 percent and
calculate with an equity premium of 4 percent, which is a standard value in the
literature on life cycle line portfolio choice.
13. A Jarque–Bera test is applied to test the normal distribution at each observable
regime. The null hypothesis of normal distribution cannot be rejected at a 5
percent significance level. The critical values are computed using Monte Carlo
simulation for small sample sizes.
14. This accords with empirical evidence regarding pre/postconsumption patterns
in Aguiar and Hurst (2005).
15. This is in line with the simulations developed by Brady (2009).
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